We review the history of financial literacy, as it applies to public company audit committees; we report on a financial literacy quiz that we have given to over 1,400 members of corporate boards, not all audit committee members. We develop a classification to score the potential of corporate audit committees to be financially literate, as defined in this paper, based on listing requirements of the NYSE, as promulgated late in 1999. We score audit committees of approximately 300 large companies in 2000 and 2004, and of a subsample in 1996 as well. We find that scores did not change between 1996 and 2000, but have improved significantly since. Still, the audit committees have room for improved financial literacy in the sense that we define. We also find evidence of superior stock market returns to companies who have improved the potential for financial literacy, as we measure it, of their audit committees over the last four years. The improvers in our sample enjoyed annualized abnormal, excess returns of 4.6 percent per year more than those which did not improve.
(a) Each audit committee shall consist of at least three directors, all of whom have no relationship to the company that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and the company ("Independent"); (b) Each member of the audit committee shall be financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the company's Board of Directors in its business judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her appointment to the audit committee; and …. board. Aside from the Blue Ribbon recommendation specifically mentioning what we might call accounting literacy, listing requirements have not focused on accounting matters. 5 Then, in 2002, came the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [ SOx] , which requires that public companies have an Audit Committee Financial Expert [ACFE] , or explain why they do not. 6 The requirements for the ACFE do not necessarily imply accounting literacy, however, as they allow financial executives with no accounting experience to be the ACFE 7 .
More important for financial literacy, SOx established the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board [PCAOB, but a misnomer, as considering the role SOx has given the PCAOB, Accounting should be Auditing]. The PCAOB initially proposed that the auditor should find a company's internal controls deficient if it judged the audit committee to be ineffective. Auditors objected to the PCAOB's proposal because a company can offset any given weakness in an internal control system with some compensating strength elsewhere, and that overall internal control is the issue, not the specific components of the process. The audit committee is just one component of the process. The final rule promulgated by the PCAOB adopted this portfolio approach to internal control: 
Ineffective oversight by the audit committee of the company's external financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting should be regarded as at least a significant deficiency and is a strong indicator that a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting exists.
5 Some professors of corporate finance have bristled at our suggestions that their performance on the financial literacy quiz described below suggests a lack of such literacy. These professors don't mind being judged illiterate in accounting, but do in finance. 
Financial (Accounting) Literacy
We have developed criteria for financial literacy in presentations to board members. We base the criteria on the mandatory disclosure of Critical Accounting Policies and Estimates [CAPE] 9 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Section 404, July 2004, pp 27-28. 10 Cunningham [2004] explores the inherent contradiction of having the audit committee hire the auditor, as SOx requires, and then having the auditor assess the effectiveness of the audit committee, as the PCAOB, created by SOx, requires. He suggests the states should create certifications for audit committees. We guess that how wellintentioned such credentialing efforts, they will fail on implementation grounds. Emphasis will focus on compliance, not knowledge as we suggest here, audit committee members should have. Example: Did management make an estimate (or change an accounting method) to achieve a financial reporting objective-that is, meet an earnings target? Example: Did management, using LIFO, delay year-end purchases so that cost of goods sold would decline relative to normal year-end purchasing behavior, increasing earnings by a few cents per share?
While these criteria seem straightforward, even minimal, we have anecdotal push-back. The audit committee chairman of one of the largest and best known U.S. companies said, "These criteria are wrong. I know I'm good enough to be the audit committee chairman, but my company's transactions are too complicated for me to understand them all." This chairman fails even our first test. Note that the criteria don't say, "Understand all the transactions," but do require understanding the ones where accounting choices materially affect the financial statements. Another audit committee member said, "I don't need to know all that; I am a good judge of character and the top executives of my company are the most honest people I have ever met."
Results of Financial Literacy Quiz
We have developed a multiple-choice quiz covering a variety of accounting and audit committee topics, which we have offered to over 2,000 attendees at the Chicago GSB, Stanford Law School, and Wharton multiple-day executive education sessions for board members. Over the past five years, more than 1,400 attendees, almost all board members or CEOs or CFOs or general counsel, have taken this quiz. The 25-item quiz contains 13 questions whose answers are in the textbook we have used to teach first-quarter, first-year MBA students, 2 items of basic audit committee issues, and 7 items required clear understanding of some topics currently pertinent for many companies, but advanced. See Exhibit 2 for a compilation of question topics, our taxonomy of difficulty level, and the results.
The median score on this quiz is about 8 correct out of 25, and this score has remained constant over several years' of testing. The results point to financial illiteracy. The individual quiz takers, self-selected from larger audiences, are likely people more confident of their financial literacy than those who did not take the quiz. 13 Note that fewer than 30 percent of the respondents gave the correct answer for six items which one could answer from the first-term MBA textbook. One of these, item 20 on retained earnings, as defined in Chapter 2 of the textbook, has only 40 percent correct answers. The people who took this quiz, likely the better half of our board member attendees, are not yet financially literate, at least about accounting matters. Perhaps our quiz is so difficult that you think an accounting literate board member needn't score more than 8 or 9 correct out of 25. We do not provide the quiz in this article, as we try to keep it from going into general circulation, hence ruining its use as a quiz. 14 We gave the participants at the conference in November 2006 a copy of the questions, but not the answers
Survey of Efforts to Track or Improve Financial Literacy
In 2002, we sent a short questionnaire to audit committee chairs. The survey's most substantive questions asked:
• 13 One of us can report that in over 40 years of teaching, many students have said the equivalent of, "I don't have time to take the [optional] exam in class you're about to give, but, don't worry, I know the material. I'm just too busy." Not once has such a student excelled on the final examination in the same course. We think it unlikely that those who have attended these sessions and chosen not to take the quiz would have done better than those who did. 14 If you want a copy of the quiz, write Roman.Weil@ChicagoGSB.edu. You will receive a copy of the quiz. If you want a copy of the answers, you have to take the quiz and send in your answers, as instructed on the cover page of the quiz.
Summary of the Results
We received 27 responses, 25 from audit committee chairs and 2 from CFOs. None of the respondents reported any formal process to assess the financial literacy of the audit committee members. The majority of the respondents report that the someone-general counsel, other board members, management, search firms-screen candidates before nominating them. Two-thirds assessed the financial literacy of the potential audit committee members by looking at the background of the candidates and evaluating their academic and professional experience. Two responded that they do not assess financial literacy. Another two responded that they perform the assessment informally and gave no details of the assessment process. The remainder responded that the board reviews the members but they did not mention the process by which they review their financial literacy.
Not one of the respondents indicated that their board had any formal process to increase financial literacy of the audit committee members. Several report that board members attended seminars, read publications, and hired consultants to meet with them and management to review financial issues. We found evidence neither of formal training nor of systematic steps taken by the firm to increase the literacy of the audit committee members. None of the respondents indicated that they had any way of evaluating the impact of practices that they do follow to increase financial literacy.
Rating Audit Committee Potential for Financial Literacy
Where are we? We know that those who voluntarily take our quiz score low, even on basic MBA-level accounting questions. What we can learn about the actual people who comprise audit committees today?
Scoring Individual Audit Committee Members
We have devised a protocol for scoring the career potential for financial (accounting) literacy of audit committee members, using information provided in the company's proxy statement about each member's career. We use a four-grade score: of cases this code represents None, when we apply our ranking of the top three members of an audit committee to an occasional committee having fewer than three members).
We find readers comfortable with this classification, with the possible exception of the distinction between the scores of 4 and 3. Many, likely more than half, of present-day CFOs are 3s.
The most common career path to CFO has been through the position of corporate treasurer, which does not require knowledge of generally accepted accounting principles at the level a controller needs. As a result of conversations with such CFOs and others who work with them, we see a distinct difference in the potential for financial (recall, meaning accounting) literacy between treasurers and controllers. 15 Similarly, we think former investment banker CFOs have had less exposure to accounting issues than controllers in their career paths to CFO. As little substantive exposure to accounting issues as the treasurer/CFO has had, the CEO likely has had less. Hence we score CEOs who have not had experience as a financial executive a notch below the financial executive.
Scoring Audit Committees
We grade each audit committee in our sample with a 3-part grade that can range from 111
[worst] to 444 [best] . If a company has more than three members on its audit committee, we use the top three scores. 16 In all, we have scored for this study the audit committees of approximately 300 companies, virtually all having at least three members. Thus, we scored more than 900 individual audit committee members.
Companies Rated
We rated the 200 largest and 100 smallest companies in the Fortune 1000 list, as published in 
Results
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More than one CFO treats as a badge of honor the fact that he (these are always men) doesn't know GAAP, but relies on a trusted controller. 16 We view financial literacy ranking as lexicographic in the sense that one member with score 4 is better than five members with score 2. 
Hall of Fame
No company has an audit committee with a score of 444, which likely means that board nominating committees think not every audit committee member needs to understand GAAP in Farber [2004] found, in a sample of firms cited for violation of SEC Rule 10b-5, a positive association between fraud detection and subsequent improvements in the quality of the board of directors and audit committee activity. 18 One of its members receiving a score of 4 might be a 3. The member has never been an auditor or a controller, but has been on the board of the AICPA and a trustee of the Financial Accounting Foundation. 19 See the data at http://securities.stanford.edu/, which suggests that any one company has about a 2 percent chance of being involved in accounting-related scandals in any one year. This suggests that any one company has at best a 98 percent chance of avoiding accounting-related scandal, assuming perfect serial dependence. The chance that 37 independent events each with 98 percent of success will all have successful outcomes is .98 37 , i.e., about 47.5 percent, which means the chance of at least one failure is about 52.5 percent.
Do the data in Exhibit 1 suggest progress towards greater audit committee financial literacy?
Yes. We performed the following simple test. First, focus on the companies in which audit committee scores changed clearly for the better (93) or for the worse (23), excluding the 72 whose scores did not change and the 12 whose score changes were indeterminate. There are 116 (= 93 + 23) audit committees changing clearly for the better or for the worse, among which 80 percent changed for the better. We specify a null hypothesis that, conditional on observing a classifiable change, changes for the better and for the worse are equally likely. We then calculate, based on these data, the two-sided p-value under this null hypothesis of equal probabilities. (What are the chances that with 116 coin flips, each having equal chances of heads or tails, there will be a preponderance of heads or tails as great as 93 of 116?) The p-value is less than .0001, indicating a statistically significant elevation above 50 percent of the proportion of changes for the better. Do the changes for the better arise only for the largest companies? No. We examined that question by creating a cross-classification, paralleling Exhibit 1, for the 100 smallest companies in the same Fortune 1000 list as we used to find the largest 200. The smallest 100 have revenues between $1.2 billion and $1.4 billion, while the largest 200 have revenues between $9 billion (Avnet) and $259 billion (Wal-Mart). Again, we specify a null hypothesis that conditional on observing a classifiable change, changes for the better and for the worse are equally likely. Fifty-five of the 100 have classifiable changes, 45 (i.e., 82 percent) for the better and 10 for the worse. Based on these data, the two-sided p-value under the null hypothesis of equal probabilities is also less than .0001. Here also the proportion of changes for the better appears statistically significantly elevated. We do not show these data, which you can get from the authors.
Timing of Changes in Regulations Appear to Matter
Have things changed since the new listing requirements have taken effect? Yes. We examine that question by creating the cross-classification, paralleling Exhibit 1, for the 50 largest companies in our list between 1996 and 2000. You can get these data, too, from the authors, by writing us.
Again, we specify a null hypothesis that, conditional on observing a classifiable change, changes for the better and for the worse are equally likely. Twenty-eight of the 50 have classifiable changes, 15 (i.e., 54 percent, compared to 80 and 82 percent in Exhibit 1) for the better and 13 for the worse. Based on these data, the two-sided p-value under the null hypothesis of equal probabilities is 0.850. These changes unlike those in Exhibit 1, indicate no statistically significant departure from equal probabilities of a change up and a change down. 20 In other words, behavior since the new listing requirements looks different.
Market Reaction to Audit Committee Potential for Financial Literacy
There is evidence that the market reacts as though it prefers an audit committee with more potential for financial, that is accounting, literacy. DeFond, Hann, and Hu [2004] found significantly positive cumulative abnormal residuals around the appointment of accounting financial experts to the audit committee, but not around the appointment of non-accounting financial experts or directors without financial expertise. Davidson, et al. [2004] investigated stock returns surrounding 136 appointments of directors to audit committees, and found significantly positive stock price reaction when new members of audit committees have financial expertise. We report our own tests next.
We partitioned those of our 300 companies having sufficient market data for our tests forty-six did not. In this group, the improvers out-(excess)-earned the non-improvers by over 31 percent during the four years, or 7 percent per year. These differences are statistically significant in terms of a permutation test on the t statistic for the effect of "Improved" status in a two-way analysis of variance (p = 0.01).
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The excess returns difference between improvers and non-improvers is not monotonic across sub-groups. We have not tested why this might be so, but we hypothesize that, like us, the market prefers quality over quantity, and views as 411 as preferable to 333. We prefer, but don't know if the market prefers, one accounting expert, joined by two university presidents, to three corporate treasurers or investment bankers. The improvement from a 222 or worse is less likely to improve to 4xx than is a 333, which, if it improves, must add at least one 4.
Costs and Benefits of a More Literate Audit Committee
What does it cost to improve the potential literacy of the audit committee? The out-of-pocket cost is likely zero, but surely less than $100,000 per year for replacing a 3 or 2 or 1 with a member who scores 4. Consider that we know, anecdotally, dozens of potential 4s [think former partners at Arthur Andersen or retirees from the Big 4 accounting firms who must leave the firm at age 60 or 61] who can do the work. These 4s don't bring glamour, but they are abundant. On average for companies with market capitalization of $10 billion, companies which improved their audit committees' potential literacy had increases in wealth of about $580 million per year 25 Specifically, this two-way analysis of variance included main effects for initial-score-group and improvementstatus. Because we expect that the standard assumptions for the validity of parametric ANOVA test statistics do not apply to our data, we applied a nonparametric method to the ANOVA t statistic for the effect of "Improved." We used a Monte Carlo method to approximate the permutation distribution of the t statistic under permutation of the "Improved" and "Not improved" labeling of companies within each subgroup based on initial committee structure. In a random sample of 1,000 permutations, the recalculated t statistic was greater than or equal to our sample value in 10 cases, yielding an estimated p-value of 0.010, with a 99 percent upper confidence bound of 0.020.
greater than the companies whose audit committees didn't improve. You can hire a lot of exAndersen partners for $600 million per year.
Further Directions
Audit committee members appear not yet literate if by financially literate we mean understanding accounting at the level of an introductory MBA accounting course. Boards appear to have begun the process of improving financial literacy. Shareholders appear to benefit from the company's having a more literate audit committee and the magnitude of the return dwarfs the costs of increasing that literacy.
We are now comparing the scores of audit committees of a matched sample of companies-those in options backdating trouble and those otherwise similar, which are not. We expect to find that those who are in trouble have audit committees with lower scores for potential financial literacy than the matched companies, who are not in trouble.
Should We Test Nominees for Audit Committee Membership?
Now that we know audit committee members are illiterate about accounting matters, the question naturally arises: should we have externally-imposed standards for audit committee membership?
Yes, if we authors of this paper get to set the standards and become the gatekeepers. No, otherwise. We think nominating committees should choose their own audit committees. We can publicize the benefits to having literate members and let the self-interests of the board nominating committees take the matter from there.
.
Appendix. Illustration of Financial Literacy Criteria, Based on Kodak's Disclosure
We illustrate the 4-point criteria for financial literacy using Kodak management's disclosure of its critical accounting policies and estimates. Kodak mentions inventory issues in its note: "Kodak reduces the carrying value of its inventory based on estimates of what is excess, slow-moving and obsolete, as well as inventory whose carrying value is in excess of net realizable value…."
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And: management can manipulate end-of-period purchases to manipulate income under LIFO.
And: the audit committee should be ready to understand why entering a new line of business will enable avoiding decrements to LIFO layers and avoiding higher tax payments than would occur without the new line.
